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BETWEEN PUBLICITY AND DISCRETION: THE INTERNATIONAL 






After World War I, the ‘Old Diplomacy’ of secret bilateral treaties and power politics, 
seen to have caused the war, had to make way for the ‘New Diplomacy’: multilateral, 
democratic and proceeding in public view. 1  The League of Nations became the 
epicentre of this ‘New Diplomacy.’ As South African statesman and League supporter 
Jan Smuts pointed out: ‘the League will never be a great success until there is formed 
as its main support a powerful international public opinion.’2 Civil society networks 
surrounding the League eagerly and explicitly participated to make this happen. In turn, 
the League informally and more or less hesitantly drew on civil society actors. 
Elsewhere in this volume, Karen Gram-Skjoldager and Haakon Ikonomou take up 
Susan Pedersen’s question of how the League worked. In her landmark article, Back to 
the League of Nations, Pedersen also argued that the League ‘fed off and promoted 
 
1 Arno J. Mayer, Political origins of the New Diplomacy 1917-1918 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
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2 Jan Smuts, The League of Nations. A Practical Suggestion (1918) 36. 
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popular mobilization’, calling for more attention to civil society networks.3  To answer 
Pedersen’s question and to understand how international public administration 
operated, this chapters argues that we also need to take civil society actors into account. 
For the League, both technical and general voluntary societies provided crucial support 
as well as scrutiny to its work. The International Federation of League of Nations 
Societies (IFLNS) is ideally suited to analyse the entanglement between the League 
Secretariat, states and civil society actors.  
At the League, ‘NGO’s’ did not have an official status, like they do at the United 
Nations (UN). However, this did not prevent civil society from playing a significant 
role. (Partly) because of its unofficial status it complemented the neutral Secretariat and 
the overtly political League Council and Assembly. This was on the one hand due to 
the activities the IFLNS deployed and how for example states used the IFLNS as an 
alternative international venue. However, the most important factor for the role the 
IFLNS played were the actors involved. They moved from civil society organisations 
to the League Secretariat, from national and international politics to bureaucracies and 
from being experts to publicists and businesspeople and vice versa. The IFLNS played 
a central role in this network and could therefore function as an informal liaison as well 
as a testing ground, in addition to its more straightforward publicity work.  
Building on pre-war organisations, in many countries societies were formed that 
supported the work of the League. In some countries these were unified societies such 
as the powerful British League of Nations Union4, or the Dutch Vereeniging voor 
 
3 Susan Pedersen, ‘Back to the League of Nations’, American Historical Review, 112, 4 (2007) 1091-
1117, 1096-7, see also Susan Pedersen, The Guardians. The League of Nations and the Crisis of 
Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 8. 
4 Helen McCarthy, The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and 
Internationalism, c. 1918-45 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), Donald S. Birn, The 
League of Nations Union, 1918-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), Gaynor Johnson, Lord Robert 
Cecil. Politician and Internationalist (Farnham: Ashgate 2013). 
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Volkenbond en Vrede.5 In other countries, such as France, a considerable number of 
peace or League societies cooperated in a national federation.6 At the international 
level, most of these national societies cooperated in the IFLNS. 
The IFLNS saw itself as an ‘avant-garde’ to the League: it promoted its work, it 
maintained contact with societies in countries outside the League and investigated new 
or controversial topics. In this manner the IFLNS combined propaganda and policy 
work.7 Aiming to democratize international relations, the IFLNS sought to both shape 
and represent public opinion through propaganda and education work and ‘democratic’ 
oversight of League activities. The IFLNS provided an international platform for actors 
of all sorts, from liberal internationalists to a wide array of disenfranchised actors. In 
attempting to channel these sentiments the Federation aimed to go beyond popularising 
and explaining the League, and also to provide a form of political legitimacy to its work. 
Thus the IFLNS aspired to become an unofficial ‘third chamber’ to the League.8 
However, in her abovementioned article Pedersen also highlighted the dangers of 
mobilizing public opinion. While public support and scrutiny were hoped to buttress 
collective security, it became clear that public opinion was not always ‘pacific nor (…) 
easily appeased’.9 Examining the IFLNS shows how a quest for the democratization of 
international society brought with it frictions between universal hopes and 
particularistic ends. At the IFLNS tensions between national and imperial interests, 
 
5 Remco van Diepen, Voor Volkenbond en vrede: Nederland en het streven naar een nieuwe 
wereldorde, 1919-1946 (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1999), Anne-Isabelle Richard, ‘Between the League 
of Nations and Europe. Multiple Internationalisms and Interwar Dutch Civil Society’, in: Ruud van 
Dijk et al eds., Shaping the International Relations of the Netherlands 1815-2000. A Small Country on 
the Global Scene (Abingdon: Routlegde 2018), 97-116. 
6 Jean-Michel Guieu, Le rameau et le glaive: les militants français pour la Société des Nations (Paris: 
Presses de Sciences Po, 2008), Christian Birebent, Militants de la paix et de la SDN (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2007). 
7 Théodore Ruyssen, ‘Un année bien remplie’, Bulletin, 1929, 1, p. 9.  
8 Jan Smuts, 13 February 1919, Peace Conference Commission on the League of Nations. Felix 
Morley, The Society of Nations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1932): 116. 
9 Pedersen, ‘Back to the League’, 1096-7. 
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international aspirations and transnational activities came together. At times, the public 
view required by the New Diplomacy and needed for the Federation’s propaganda 
activities clashed with the discretion international relations and policy work often 
necessitated. Not only the IFLNS struggled with these issues, they applied to many 
other similar organisations and above all to the League itself.  
While the literature has headed Pedersen call for more attention for civil society 
networks around the League and an increasing number of national League societies is 
being researched, the IFLNS itself is only starting to be explored.10 The balancing act 
between publicity and discretion that characterised League internationalism however 
benefits from an analysis of the reciprocal relationship between the IFLNS and the 
League Secretariat. This approach simultaneously highlights the significance of civil 
society platforms in addition to official channels, as well as stressing the fact that the 
actors involved defy easy categorization as state, civil society or international agents. 
It is the networked character and the multitude of roles and contacts that gave these 
actors relevance and carries their interwar experiences in to the post-1945 period. This 
chapter claims no comprehensiveness; rather than detailing all the activities of the 
IFLNS, it will touch upon some of the substantive activities of the IFLNS related to 
‘Information’ and Minorities, to illustrate the practice of internationalism the 
Federation developed between the League, the Secretariat, states and a global public.11  
 
10  For national societies beyond those cited above see for example: Kuniyuki Terada, Actors in 
International Cooperation in Pre-war Japan. The Discourse on International Migration and the League 
of Nations Association of Japan Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018), Tomoko Akami, ‘Experts and the 
Japanese Association of the League of Nations in the International Context, 1919–1925’, in Joy Damousi 
and Patricia O'Brien (ed.), The League of Nations, Histories, Legacies and Impact (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 2018): 158-178. On the IFLNS see Anne-Isabelle Richard, ‘Competition 
and complementarity: civil society networks and the question of decentralising the League of Nations’, 
Journal of Global History 7, no. 2 (2012): 233-256, Jean Michel Guieu, ‘La SDN et ses organisations de 
soutien dans les années 1920. Entre promotion de l'esprit de genève et volonté d'influence’, Relations 
Internationales 151, no. 3 (2012): 11-23, Thomas R. Davies, ‘Internationalism in a divided world: the 
experience of the International Federation of the League of Nations Societies, 1919-1939’, 
Peace&Change 37, no. 2 (2012): 227-252. 




The organization of IFLNS Internationalism 
 
How were the IFLNS and its national constituents from over thirty countries organised? 
Building on pre-war peace and women’s movements and following inter-Allied 
contacts during the War, the IFLNS was established in Brussels in 1919 and was fully 
operational by 1921.12 The organisational set-up of the Federation, and of many other 
similar organisations, largely mirrored that of the League. It had a General Assembly - 
meeting once a year in a major city- a Council, a Bureau drawn from the Council, and 
a Secretariat.13 There were initially four standing committees, also modelled on the 
League and International Labour Organization (propaganda and education; national 
minorities; international labour legislation, social and economic questions; political and 
legal questions).14 Theodore Ruyssen, the doyen of the Association de la Paix pour le 
Droit and professor of philosophy in Bordeaux became Secretary-General. He retired 
in 1939 and was succeeded by the young British barrister, LNU activist and later 
president of European Free Trade Area, Frank Figgures. These careers on either side of 
the interwar period indicate the longer history and the connections between 
international civil society and international organisations. In 1923 an ‘English-speaking 
Assistant Secretary-General’ was appointed. 15  From the outset there were close 
personnel ties between the League Secretariat and the IFLNS. In between serving in the 
 
12 League of Nations Journal and Monthly Report, February 1919, p. 72. 
13 ‘Session d’automne du Bureau’, Bulletin, 1933, 5, p. 321. 
14  League of Nations Archives, Geneva (henceforth LoNA), International Federation of League of 
Nations Societies (henceforth: IFLNS), P102, Interview Ruyssen, Brussels, February 1931. 
15 LoNA, IFLNS, P102, Note: Appointment of an English-Speaking Assistant Secretary-General, 18 
December 1923. Early English translations make the need for an Anglophone Secretary clear, Bulletin, 
3, p. 16 and pp. 28-29. 
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League Secretariat Political and Minorities Sections, William O’Molony functioned as 
the IFLNS English Secretary. In 1926 he was succeeded by Captain Lothian Small. 
From 1927 a germanophone Assistant Secretary-General was added, first Hermann 
Kirchhoff, then between 1928 and 1935 Albert von Bodman.  
IFLNS leadership positions read as a who’s who of interwar internationalists. 
Figures such as conservative politician and president of the British LNU Lord Robert 
Cecil (Viscount Cecil of Chelwood), the Belgian socialist and later president of the 
European Court of Human Rights Henri Rolin or German diplomat Count Johann 
Heinrich Bernstorff all served as President. They were supported by the Bureau that 
included an expanding group of prominent Vice-Presidents, a Treasurer, until 1935 this 
was the Belgian lawyer, senator and founder of the Union of International Associations, 
Henri la Fontaine, a number of auditors and the Secretariat. The funding for the IFLNS 
came for about two-thirds from contributions from member organisations. They, in 
turn, were often (partly) funded by governments. Another part of the income of the 
IFLNS came from gifts from private individuals or foundations such as the Americans 
Theodore Marburg, James J. Forstall or the Carnegie Foundation.16 All of these actors 
were also involved with the League in other capacities as well, as national delegates, as 
experts, as funders etc, creating a tight network. 
The number of women in significant posts, chairing committees and Bureau 
sessions, increased with the years and saw a spread across Europe.17 Particularly the 
1930s saw women such as LNU heavyweight Lady Gladstone and future treasurer of 
the World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA) Christina Bakker-van 
Bosse represented amongst the Vice-Presidents and the Honorary Members of the 
 
16 Bulletin, 1929, 5, p. 3, and 1931, 4, p. 7, 1931, 5, p. 38. 
17 LoNA, P102, Listes des personnalités féminines membres d’Associations pour la Société des 
Nations.  
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Council. Although the IFLNS probably did not go much beyond the League in ‘only 
partly fulfil[ing] the hopes of international feminists’, it nonetheless provided a parallel 
track to engage in International Relations as a woman.18 
The IFLNS was explicitly made up of national organisations. Many interwar 
internationalists (and the IFLNS) conceived of internationalism as building on 
nationalism. Much like for the League, for the IFLNS international peace and 
understanding were clear aims, but patriotism was by no means rejected. Although 
national egoisms had to be overcome, ‘love of the fatherland was as honourable as love 
of humanity’. 19  They often distinguished between ‘good patriotism and ‘bad 
nationalism’. 20  Despite the explicit possibilities to accommodate various forms of 
patriotism, participating societies could be explicitly nationalistic. This had 
repercussions for the room for manoeuvre for the Federation, since one of its overriding 
aims was to keep lines of contact open to as many associations as possible. Coupled 
with a sensitivity to state interests, the international platform the IFLNS provided was 
often used for national(istic) aims.  
Within the IFLNS the British LNU was by far the largest member. The relationship 
between the organisations was not always smooth, something that also influences the 
LNU-based literature on the IFLNS. A continued source of debate between the LNU 
and the other members of the IFLNS was the location of the IFLNS secretariat. The 
LNU preferred Geneva, the others Brussels. It was cheaper and signalled the 
 
18 Susan Pedersen, ‘Metaphors of the schoolroom: women working the Mandates System of the League 
of Nations’, History Workshop Journal 66, no. 1 (2008): 188-207. 
19 LoNA, IFLNS, P93, Assembly files, General Assembly Lyon 1924, M.W.F. Treub. 
20 Anne-Isabelle Richard, ‘Huizinga, intellectual Cooperation and the Spirit of Europe, 1933-1945’, in: 
Mark Hewitson and Matthew D’Auria (eds.), Europe in Crisis. Intellectuals and the European idea, 
1917-1957 (Oxford: Berghahn 2012), 243-257, in particular 245, John Breuilly, Nationalism and the 
State (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1993) 8, Patricia Clavin and Glenda Sluga, 
‘Rethinking the History of Internationalism’, in Ibid., Internationalisms. A Twentieth Century History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017), 3-16, 10. 
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independence of the IFLNS from the League.21 Until 1934, when the LNU got its way 
and the secretariat moved to Geneva permanently, it moved to Geneva only in summer 
in the run up to the League General Assembly to ensure enough close contact.22 In 
Geneva it organised many (social) events for League and IFLNS delegates, contributing 
to the socializing effects of the ‘Geneva spirit’, and initiating delegates from non-
member states into that spirit in preparation of their country joining the League.  
The membership of the IFLNS peaked in the early thirties at about 1.5 million. 
Associate and corporate membership, that led to dissemination of League ideas in other 
bodies, such as trade unions or ex-servicemen leagues, would make this number 
significantly higher. 23  While the IFLNS comprised societies in 50 countries from 
Argentina to India and Japan and despite the declared universalism and global reach of 
the IFLNS, most League societies were European.24 Like the League, the IFLNS sought 
to balance this situation by reaching out to societies outside the west – whilst upholding 
empire.25 With some success they hoped to stimulate the creation of new associations 
through a worldwide correspondence, and by sending envoys.26 Despite these efforts, 
most of the existing non-European societies relied on compatriots residing in Europe to 
represent them.27  
The Chinese and Japanese Associations recognised the relevance of the IFLNS 
early on and managed to set up durable organisations. In 1920 one of the founders of 
the Japanese League of Nations Association (JLNA), the diplomat Matsui Keishiro 
 
21 Ruyssen, ‘Les Associations pour la Société des Nations et leur Associations Internationales’, Bulletin, 
1926, 1, pp. 2-14, p. 13 
22 ‘Session d’automne du Bureau’, Bulletin, 1933, 5, p. 321. ‘Conference de Prague, Modification des 
statuts’, Bulletin, 1922, 4, p. 8.  
23 ‘Discours du Vicomte Cecil of Chelwood, Président de l’Union’, Bulletin, 1929, 1, p. 30.  
24 LoNA, IFLNS, P102, Interview with Ruyssen, Brussels, February 1931.  
25 See also Mark Mazower, No enchanted palace: the end of empire and the ideological origins of the 
United Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
26 Bulletin, ‘Assemblée’, 1928, p. 25. 
27 Bulletin, 1935, 3, p. 165. 
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explained the importance of the IFLNS to Japanese foreign policy as follows: firstly, 
the members of European League societies were important politicians and scholars who 
could influence public opinion in their respective countries. Secondly, membership of 
the IFLNS gave Japan the opportunity to ‘see what other countries were planning [to 
discuss at the League of Nations] as well as show Japan’s eagerness to contribute to 
world peace.’28 Keishiro highlighted how the IFLNS could function as a transmission 
belt to influence public opinion and to gather information on future policy. 
In order to make the Federation more global, plans for an annual Assembly meeting 
outside of Europe circulated since the early 1920s. As part of its efforts to use 
international forums to strengthen their position vis-a-vis Japan, the Chinese society 
offered to host the Annual Assembly in the late 30s.29 The IFLNS was an obvious 
choice given its standing but also its links to the International Peace Campaign, which 
was very strong on and in China.30 However, given the circumstances in China in 1938-
9, the IFLNS re-located the meeting to New York, where the World’s Fair took place 
in 1939-40. The US were not a member of the League, but the IFLNS hoped that having 
the congress take place in the US, would strengthen the pro-League and anti-isolationist 
tendencies amongst the American, leading to League membership.31 In the end, the 
1939 Assembly never took place.32 The offers from non-European societies show the 
importance they accorded to an, unofficial, international platform and to being 
associated with the Federation and by extension the League, also in the late 1930s.  
 
28 Cited in Terada, Actors, 109: ‘Kokusai renmei Kyokai ni kansuru Matsui no iken [Ambassador 
Matsui’s opinion about the League of Nations societies], Japan Centre for Asian Historical Records: 
B04013930300,42. 
29 Bulletin,  1925, 4, p. 28; 3, 1934, p. 119; 1937, 4, p. 264-7. See also: Tsuchida Akio, ‘China’s 
‘Public Diplomacy’ toward the United States before Pearl Harbor’, Journal of American–East Asian 
Relations 17, no. 1 (2010): 35–55. 
30 Ke Ren, ‘The International Peace Campaign, China, and Transnational Activism at the Outset of 
World War II’, in: Christian Philip Peterson, William M. Knoblauch, and Michael Loadenthal eds., The 
Routledge History of World Peace Since 1750 (Abingdon: Routledge 2019), 359-370. 
31 LoNA, IFLNS, P113, Circulars, Circular 170, 20 January 1939. 
32 Ibid, Circular 173, 17 April 1939, Circular 176, 29 August 1939. 
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Most League societies were relatively elitist affairs. The British LNU was the only 
organisation that could claim genuine grass roots involvement with at its peak over 
400,000 members.33 Members of League societies often represented an educated public 
with an interest in foreign affairs. However, also pacifist, ex-servicemen and women’s 
rights circles were well represented. In the later 30s a number of organisations joined, 
who, within the framework of the League, sought peace and international cooperation 
through slightly different means than the IFLNS. The Comité Fédéral de Coopération 
Européenne and the New Commonwealth Society both aimed for European 
cooperation, while the latter also favoured military force for peace.34  When in 1937 
the International Peace Campaign, led by IFLNS and LNU heavyweight Robert Cecil 
and French Popular Front minister Pierre Cot, joined the Federation, left wing groups 
became better represented – with fear of Communist involvement also strengthening.35 
The fact that all of the organizations that joined had a significant overlap in membership 
facilitated the affiliation. It is noteworthy that these actors, rather than leaving the 
IFLNS sought to supplement it with other approaches. 
As mentioned before, the individuals involved in the IFLNS constituted a highly 
networked group, they played multiple, simultaneous roles in ‘international society’. 
They often participated in a number of voluntary organizations, while also engaging in 
international society as national delegates to the League, (inter)national civil servants, 
experts, journalists or bankers. 36  Organising IFLNS Council meetings in Geneva 
around the time of the League General Assembly allowed for delegates to attend both. 
 
33 McCarthy, The British People, 4.  
34 Bulletin Union International des Associations pour la Société des Nations (henceforth Bulletin), 
1930, 5, p. 17; 1934, 4, p. 191; 1937, 5, p. 239-41. Richard, ‘Competition’, Christoph Ploß, Die "New 
Commonwealth Society". Ein Ideen-Laboratorium für den supranationalen europäischen 
Integrationsprozess )Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2017).  
35 Bulletin, 1937, 5, p. 239-41, Ren, ‘The International Peace Campaign’. 
36 On these networks see: Patricia Clavin, ‘Defining transnationalism’, Contemporary European History 
14, no. 4 (2005): 421–439. 
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Meetings in Geneva also facilitated attendance by, as well as informal contacts with, 
League Secretariat members. In turn, other organizations, such as the Comité Federal 
de Coopération Européenne, let their annual conference follow or precede the IFNLS 
annual conference for the same purpose. This networked character, which facilitated 
informal contacts and informal diplomacy, added to the impact of the IFLNS. 
The Dane Ludvig Krabbe of the Information Section commented about the 
Federation Assembly in Geneva in 1930: ‘The fact that many of those who took part in 
the discussion were also delegates to the Assembly of the League (…), contributed to 
creating an impression that one was present less at a manifestation of representatives of 
public opinion of the various countries, than of a League Assembly in miniature which 
took place in calmer circumstances (…), far from the political passions.’ 37  This 
qualifies the idea that the IFLNS just represented public opinion. In expressing 
Secretariat opinion, Krabbe drew attention to the position of the IFLNS in between the 
neutral Secretariat and the political turmoil of the Assembly. Civil society offered 
politicians another forum to debate the questions of the times away from the pressure 
of official representations, thus facilitating discussion.  
The observation by Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessels in relation to the 
Economic and Financial Section of the League Secretariat about ‘the degree to which 
internationalism, transnationalism and multi-nationalism coexisted within the same 
organization’, also holds for the IFLNS.38 The IFLNS fashioned itself as a civil society 
actor participating in the New Diplomacy, who would propagate the League to a general 
global public and national publics as well as represent those publics, whilst not shying 
away from undertaking policy work. The practice of internationalism that the IFLNS 
 
37 LoNA, R3303, Report Krabbe, 14th General Assembly, Geneva 5-9 June 1930. 
38 Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessels, ‘Transnationalism and the League of Nations: 
Understanding the Work of its Economic and Financial Organisation’, Contemporary 
European History 14, no. 4 (2005): 465-492, 467. 
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came to style, nonetheless depended to a large degree on well-connected, high level 
actors, who tried to balance openness and discretion whilst warding off too blatant 
examples of power politics. In styling itself as the most official and most respectable 
of the private international organisations surrounding the League, the practice of 




‘Cooperative publicity’: the IFLNS and the Information Section 
 
‘Cooperative publicity’ was the term the American and second in command of the 
Information Section, Arthur Sweetser used in 1919 to describe how he envisaged the 
relationship between the Information Section and private international organisations.39 
The League Secretariat seems to have adopted this approach in other domains as well. 
The Disarmament Section for example also struggled with the need to publicise its work 
and the limits it faced in engaging in propaganda itself. Secretary-General of the Inter-
Parliamentary Union, Christian Lange suggested to Thanassis Aghnides of the 
Disarmament Section, that the Secretariat could communicate information to the 
various peace associations. These could then use this information in their propaganda 
efforts, so that arms limitations “may be imposed by peoples on Governments” as 
Aghnides put it in his proposal to Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League, 
 
39 Sweetser, ‘League of Nations publicity’, 27 May 1919, 2, quoted in Emil Seidenfaden, Message from 
Geneva. The Public Legitimization Strategies of the League of Nations and their Legacy, 1919-1946 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Aarhus 2019), 71. 
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who sanctioned the idea.40 This highlights one of the tasks the IFLNS had set itself: 
educating and activating the global public.  
How did the IFLNS go about this? It used a two-pronged strategy, reaching the 
public directly through propaganda and education activities, and reaching the public 
through national societies through the sharing of knowledge and best practices. The 
final aims of the IFLNS with this strategy were a widening of the support base for the 
League as well as putting pressure on national governments and the League to put 
questions on their agendas. Many of these activities came out of the Propaganda and 
Education Committee and can be divided in publications of various kinds (IFLNS 
Bulletin, pamphlets, posters, slide shows, radio, film, school textbooks) and events. 
Typical events included lectures by prominent members, campaigns around major 
events such as the world economic or disarmament conference, the highly publicised 
Annual Assemblies and summer schools.  
The IFLNS did not undertake this task in isolation. It was one among two hundred 
international organizations the Secretariat had been in contact with by 1934.41 The 
Information Section was responsible for most of these contacts and in particular those 
with the IFLNS (although the IFLNS also maintained close contacts to a number of 
other Sections). Emil Seidenfaden calls the relationship to the IFLNS, the Information 
Section’s ‘most ambitious attempt to directly supervise propaganda activities for the 
League through private collaborators in a way that avoided overstepping the mandate 
of the neutral secretariat.’42 The Information Section struggled with balancing between 
 
40 I am grateful to Haakon Ikonomou for drawing my attention to this reference. LoNA, R217, 
Aghnides-Drummond 3 April 1922, LoNA, R217, Aghnides-Drummond, 13 April 1922. Cited in 
Haakon A. Ikonomou “The administrative anatomy of failure: The League of Nations Disarmament 
Section, 1919-1925”, Contemporary European History, under review, 2019. 
41 LoNA, PP, P191, Committees, Liaison Committee, Information Section, ‘Memo on Liaison with 
International Organisations, 21 September 1933, 3. Quoted in Seidenfaden, Message, 72. 
42 Ibid., 81. 
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what was perceived as ‘neutral information’ and ‘propaganda’ and with how they could 
reach ‘the public’ and who that public was. Was it a general global public, an educated 
global elite, governments, national general or educated publics or all of these? 43 Since 
press contacts did not suffice: ‘a newspaper is more a means of advertisement than of 
propaganda’ 44 , the IFLNS and its members were a means through which the 
Information Section sought to get in contact with at least an educated global public.45 
These were initially informal contacts as the League ‘strove to use unofficial 
communication, and at times even semi-diplomatic activities, to compensate for its lack 
of muscle in terms of propaganda and its dogma of neutrality.’46 The strategy of the 
Information Section seemed to be that they would provide the IFLNS with neutral 
information, while the IFLNS and League Associations would transform that into a 
propaganda effort toward national publics. 47  This section, which focuses on the 
mechanics of the relationship between the Secrertariat and the IFLNS, instead of on 
their interaction (and cooperation) on substantial topics, aims to show that the 
relationship was a two way process with information, contacts and attempts at 
influencing flowing both ways.  
 
In 1921, the Information Section appointed Lithuanian feminist Princess Gabriele 
Radziwill as liaison officer for the IFLNS. The Section followed the activities of the 
IFLNS closely. While generally not referred to in an active role in the minutes, 
Radziwill and others attended Bureau, Council, and Assembly meetings.48 According 
 
43 Ibid., 74. 
44 Report on the Information Section, 16 April 1921, 12 cited in Seidenfaden, Message, 76. 
45 See also: Jonas Brendebach, Martin Herzer, Heidi Tworek eds., International Organizations and the 
Media in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Exorbitant Expectations (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2018). 
46 Seidenfaden, Message, 92, 75. 
47 Ibid., 71, 75, 76. 
48 For an overview see the delegates’ lists in the IFLNS Bulletin. 
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to Radziwill ‘much useful work was done at these meetings, mixed with a lot of 
irresponsible and useless discussion.’49 Prior to an event, the IFLNS shared the agenda 
with the Information Section, to draw attention its work and to the topics it thought 
needed attention. The Information Section in turn circulated the agenda amongst the 
Secretariat, also to spot and ‘prevent, if possible, tendencies too radical or extremist.’50 
Nonetheless, the Information Section also provided the IFLNS and its constituents with 
information and speakers. Radziwill was for example instrumental in facilitating the 
yearly summer school the IFLNS organised in Geneva. Many prominent League figures 
spoke to the students year in year out. From 1921, representatives of the IFLNS were 
received by the Secretary-General of the League, and later also by Albert Thomas of 
the ILO. From 1923 IFLNS resolutions were presented to the Secretary-General and 
were subsequently included, for information, in the Journal Officiel of the League 
Assembly (as were the communications by many other private international 
organizations). Apart from their agendas and resolutions, the IFLNS furnished the 
Information Section also with news about developments and public opinion in various 
countries and thus made the flow of information a two-way process.51  
Spanish official Joseph Plà succeeded Radziwill as liaison with the IFLNS in 1931. 
According to Seidenfaden, he was much less involved in the activities of the IFLNS 
and acted more as a conveyor of information.52 This approach corresponded to the 
official line from 1933. Apart from the ominous developments in the world; this year 
the Information Section was reorganized leading to significant cuts: to its budget, staff, 
mandate and concomitantly to its activities. This was both a result of the appointment 
 
49 LoNA R3302, Radziwill, Twelfth annual meeting of the League of Nations Unions (sic), 30 June-7 
July 1928, The Hague, 30 July 1928. 
50 Pelt, ‘Information Section – Liste des associations privées, 1933’, 8, cited in Seidenfaden, Message, 
79. 
51 For example: LoNA, R5172, Small-Pelt, 17 January 1939. 
52 Seidenfaden, Message, 157. 
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of Frenchman Joseph Avenol as new Secretary-General of the League, as well as cuts 
to the League budget as a result of withdrawals and Great Power displeasure, as Potter 
put it.53 The Section became more and more a ‘mere Press Bureau.’54 In particular there 
was less scope for liaison activities and as a result, the concept of public opinion was 
more and more matched onto government opinion. By the late 1930s the League 
legitimization strategies were more geared toward the Great Powers and avoiding 
problems, than to legitimizing itself to the general public.55 While the scope for the 
IFNLS could be argued to have increased as a result, it suffered from similar pressures 
on its resources. 
Despite the fact that the Section had a smaller mandate and that there was 
undoubtedly less engagement for fear of attracting criticism, this did not mean that 
contacts between the Section and the IFLNS ceased. An episode relating to the Bombay 
branch of the League of Nations Union shows a very high level of involvement by 
Secretariat: the dossier went between the Information Section and its Director Pelt, 
Central Section and its Director V.G. Wilson, 2 Deputy Secretary-Generals, Frank 
Walters and Pablo de Azcarate, and others for over 2 years, with both Pelt and Wilson 
visiting Bombay personally.56 Support for the League in India was not widespread. 
Some League of Nations associations existed, but they were scattered across the 
country.57 A federation of these associations could lead to more cohesion and more 
effective activities. The driving force behind this idea was Manjapra Venkatkrishna 
 
53 Pitman B. Potter, ‘League Publicity: Cause or Effect of League Failure?’, The Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 2, no. 10, (1938): 399-412, 406-407.  
54 Seidenfaden, Message, 138. 
55 Ibid., 158. 
56 LoNA, R5172, Bombay. Joseph McQuade, Terrorism, Law and Sovereignty in India and the League 
of Nations 1897-1945 (Unpublished PhD Diss. Cambridge, 2017) 146.  
57 On the League in India see: Ibid.. 
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Venkatsewaran, the Secretary of the Bombay Branch of the LNU, who also worked for 
the League’s Bombay Office.   
A very close association in personnel or other terms between a League Association 
and the League or a government was not unheard of: as has been pointed out above, 
there was a lot of overlap in functions and numerous civil servants were prominent 
members of League Associations, the Delhi branch was located in premises owned by 
the Indian Government and the Japanese League of Nations Association was closely 
associated to the Tokyo Office of the League. Deputy Secretary-General Walters saw 
the advantages of having a close link between the Bombay Office and the LNU, since 
the League needed ‘active connections at the key points scattered over the vast surface 
of India. The connections of course should primarily be official ones, but the help of 
active elements outside is desirable and indeed I should think almost indispensable.’58 
Whereas this approach was in line with the informal policy of the Information Section, 
which continued to draw on informal contacts despite its narrower official post-1933 
mandate, in this case there was more to consider. Firstly, there were tensions between 
the Bombay branch and the others, particularly the Delhi branch, which felt it should 
lead an Indian federation.59  Secondly, there were concerns over the personality of 
Venkatsewaran. If he had been more ‘energetic, fair-minded and reliable’, wrote 
Sudhindra Nath Ghose of the Information Section, the situation could be conceivable. 
However, he warned of Venkatsewaran’s motives for proposing an Indian Federation, 
effectively under his leadership: this would give him ‘greater opportunity for avoiding 
his routine work.’60 Like Walters, Pelt appreciated that circumstances in India required 
more than ‘normal’ support for the branch, but agreed that it was not ideal to have a 
 
58 LoNA, R5172, Bombay, Walters-Pelt, 27 December 1934. 
59 Ibid., Sen-Ghose, 3 April 1935. 
60 Ibid., Ghose-Pelt, 8 January 1935. 
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League official in charge. 61  Finally Professor D. Ghosh agreed to take over, in 
December 1936 – more than two years after the affair had started.62 
While the League and the Information Section seemed to have been comfortable 
with an informal arrangement that went beyond the official mandate, the danger of this 
backfiring and compromising the standing of the League seems to have been too large 
in this case. This goes a long way to explaining the extraordinary time and effort 
devoted by high-level League officials in this episode. However, this episode also 
showcases three other points. Firstly, the importance attached to events and the public 
outside of Europe as well as the difficulty in reaching those (colonial) publics. 
Secondly, it portrays once again the networked character of almost all of those involved 
in the IFLNS. Finally, this episode provides an insight into the relevance of 
personalities when dealing discretely with publicity. Everyone understood this to be a 
very delicate balancing act and Venkatsewaran could not be trusted to perform it. 
 
The IFLNS and the League (particularly the Information Section), entertained a close 
relationship throughout the interwar period. Their contact was indispensable for both 
sides and both sides tried to influence and use each other for their own purposes. The 
answer to the question of how effective the IFLNS propaganda and education work 
was, depends to a large extend on the issue, the country and the year. Overall however, 
the IFLNS was relatively successful in raising awareness about the League and 
questions of internationalism among an educated elite across Europe (Germany was 
notoriously difficult as the Information Section did not cease to point out) and in the 
1920s beyond that elite as well. The League became more cautious after 1933 in its 
contacts with private organisations. However given the political climate, the IFLNS in 
 
61 Ibid., Pelt-Ram, 6 January 1937. 
62 Ibid., Ram-Venkatsewaran, 7 January 1937, Ghosh-Ram, 11 December 1936. 
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many respects also adopted a more cautious attitude to remain a trusted interlocutor, as 
well as keep societies from countries that had left the League in the Federation. Already 
in 1930 Krabbe of the Information Section reported that ‘maybe one can even 
distinguish a certain weakness and excessive prudence in the way the Union treats 
problems. This became apparent during the discussion concerning the minorities, 
prudence which leads the Bureau to exclude from the discussion at the next meeting in 
Hungary any question that relates to that country.’63 As the League was losing its appeal 
over the course of the 1930s, so too did the IFLNS amongst the general public. This did 
not mean that its more specific campaigns in the 1930s were unsuccessful. The 
‘excessive prudence’ perhaps explains why quite a number of individual activists 
assumed that the affiliation of other organisations, such as the International Peace 




Policy work between publicity and discretion 
 
If it had been up to Cecil, the driving force behind the always critical British LNU, this 
chapter could have concluded here after the analysis of the propaganda activities of the 
IFLNS, which, according to him, were its main aim. Cecil thought the Federation 
concerned itself ‘too much with policy and too little with propaganda’.64 This opinion 
was perhaps not unexpected given the grassroots character of the LNU which made 
propaganda work much more feasible. Regardless of the question whether the 
 
63 LoNA, R3303, Report Krabbe, 14th General Assembly, Geneva 5-9 June 1930. 
64 British Library, Add Mss 51111, Cecil Papers, Cecil-Drummond, 27 April 1929. 
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combination of propaganda and policy was a wise decision and regardless of the 
feasibility of doing just one, the combination was a difficult balancing act. Where the 
League also struggled to balance publicity and discretion, the tension between the 
openness needed to serve the global public and the discretion necessary to be taken 
seriously as a policy actor played a pivotal role throughout the life of the Federation, 
and probably found expression in Krabbe’s observation about ‘excessive prudence’.65 
Regarding its work in the policy field, the IFLNS compared its role to that of a 
legislature; it provided a form of democratic oversight to the League as well initiating 
policies. The activities of the IFLNS, and of other non-governmental organisations, can 
be categorised as agenda-setting, policy formulation and implementation.66 In practice 
these activities and the audiences they served often overlapped. The agenda-setting 
activities of the IFLNS toward the ‘public’ and national societies have been touched 
upon above. In turning to activities towards governments and the League the liaison 
function of the IFLNS, that the Japanese LNA had already pointed out, becomes clear: 
the IFLNS was used as an alternative platform in what were otherwise often bilateral 
relations between states/minorities and the League. 
 
Agenda-Setting: Influencing Governments and the League 
Following the prescripts of the New Diplomacy, lobby work should take place in the 
public view, like education work. However, in practice, Federation activists often 
operated more ‘diplomatically’, using informal contacts without publicising all their 
activities. Given the networked character of the activists involved, who interacted in 
many different settings, this was an obvious approach.  
 
65 LoNA, R3303, Report Krabbe, 14th General Assembly, Geneva 5-9 June 1930. 
66 Peter Willetts, ‘From “Consultative Arrangements” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs 
in Diplomacy at the UN’, Global Governance 6, no. 2 (2000): 191-212, 196–197. See also Davies, ‘A 
“Great Experiment”’, 410. 
 21 
The first aim of the Federation in its policy work was agenda-setting. Dossiers on 
the activities of the IFLNS and their assemblies passed through all League Sections.67 
This served the purposes of both sides: while the Secretariat drew on the information, 
got a sense of ‘public opinion’, and hoped to spot and subsequently prevent radical 
tendencies, the Federation hoped to influence decision making. This could take the form 
of discussing controversial topics, before the League, or governments, felt ready to 
discuss these questions. An example is the question of decentralising the League in 
1927. The idea was that regional unions, such as a European, or Panamerican union, 
were a necessary step towards a truly universal League. While this resolution was 
rejected by the IFLNS Assembly at the time, the debate on the topic continued and was 
formally brought to the League by French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand in 1929.68 
Agenda-setting was not just geared toward the League, national governments were also 
explicitly targeted. A relatively straightforward example concerned Togoland, where 
the IFLNS Secretariat served as a liaison between the British LNU, which had collected 
material detailing ‘grave charges’ against Togoland officials, and the French League 
for the Rights of Man. They transmitted the documents to Radical Deputé Achille Rene-
Boisneuf who questioned the French Minister of Colonies after which an investigation 
was ordered.69  
States also used the IFLNS to get their causes on the League agenda. Chinese and 
Japanese examples have already been mentioned. A less well-known example comes 
from Haiti. Dantes Bellegarde, Haitian delegate to the League, but also a representative 
of the Haitian League Society, used the IFLNS to protest against the American 
occupation of Haiti. 
 
67 For example the files in: LoNA, Information Section, R5177, R5178, R5179, International 
Federation of League of Nations Societies.  
68 LoNA, IFLNS, P93, XIst Plenary Congress Berlin, 26-31 May 1927, Richard, ‘Competition’. 
69 Bulletin, News from societies, France, 1922, 3, p. 16. 
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Another form of agenda-setting were the contacts with League organizations in 
countries which were not (yet or no longer) members of the League, such as the US, 
Japan or Germany. Theses contacts were on the one hand aimed at those states and 
publics, to draw them into the League, on the other to the League itself, in order to 
accept them. However, this was also a two-way process, as states tried to set the agenda 
of the IFLNS and the League. Although Germany did not join the League until 1926, 
the Deutsche Liga für Völkerbund was a member of the Federation from 1921. The aim 
of the Deutsche Liga was to fulfil a pioneering role in facilitating German accession to 
the League. This was geared on the one hand to the sceptical German public, which had 
lost much of its initial enthusiasm for a League after Versailles, but on the other hand 
to the League. In 1920 foreign minister Walter Simons put it as follows: ‘The Liga 
should as a matter of course pursue a different policy from the government and work 
more actively for the accession of Germany to the League, otherwise she would not 
have a right to exist. … We want the League to come to us.’70 This is a clear example 
of how the Federation had its agenda, but its interlocutors had theirs too. In this case, 
the goals of these agendas overlapped (the means perhaps less). The IFLNS, driven in 
particular by the French Federation, called for German accession to the League from 
1921, when the Deutsche Liga had been admitted. 71  When Germany was finally 
admitted to the League in 1926, the IFLNS decided to hold its next Annual Assembly 
in Berlin. According to Ruyssen this was brilliantly organised by the Deutsche Liga 
and benefited from the cooperation with the German state. Chancellor Marx spoke at 
the opening and Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann at the closing ceremony. Ruyssen 
 
70  Cited in: Jost Dülfer, ‘Vom Internationalismus zum Expansionismus. Die Deutsche Liga für 
Völkerbund’, in Wolfgang Elz and Sönke Neitzel, eds., Internationale Beziehungen im 19. und 20. 
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was convinced that this was a sound basis for the further ‘development of the Federation 
and the education of the general public in the field of international politics.’ 72 
Membership figures for the Deutsche Liga certainly increased significantly in the 
aftermath of the Berlin Assembly.  
After Germany left the League, the successor to the Deutsche Liga named 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht und Völkerbundfragen remained a member of 
the IFLNS until 1938.  Both organisations were under the influence of the 
Wilhelmsstrasse. However, the post-1933 organization was quite open in its 
disagreement with the ‘Geneva Spirit’ and for example refused to attend the Glasgow 
Assembly of 1936 because the persecution of Jews in Germany was on the agenda.73 
The Federation aimed to keep channels open, also to Associations that adopted quite 
opposite views. 
This episode showcases the role the IFLNS played as a channel of contact with 
non-League member states, and as an agenda-setting organisation. However, it also 
highlights the question of the influence of national governments on civil society 
organizations who used the IFLNS. It thus shows how practices could be appropriated 
for different purposes: the pursuit of potentially nationalist goals through 
internationalist civil society means.74  
 
Policy formulation 
The next step after agenda-setting was policy formulation, which was similarly geared 
toward both the League and national governments. The IFLNS used both its personal 
 
72 Ruyssen, ‘Avant-Propos’, Bulletin, 1927, Assemblée, p. 2-3. 
73 Dülffer, ‘Vom Internationalismus’. 
74 Jürgen C. Heß, ‘Europagedanke und nationaler Revisionismus: Überlegungen zu ihrer Verknüpfung 
in der Weimarer Republik am Beispiel Wilhelm Heiles’, Historische Zeitschrift 225, no. JG (1977): 572-
622 
 24 
contacts as well the more official channel of sending its resolutions to various League 
bodies as preparation for League discussions. In 1929, parts of a minorities resolution 
by the Dutch League delegation were adopted by the Member States in the League 
Assembly. This resolution had previously been discussed and accepted at the IFLNS 
Assembly.75  This successful preliminary work to influence policy formulation led 
Ruyssen to describe the Federation as an avant-garde of the League.76  Thomas Davies 
details an example from the Disarmament Conference of where the resolutions adopted 
by the IFLNS Assembly in Budapest in 1931 became the common platform for the 
global disarmament movement and in turn ‘came to dominate the proceedings of the 
conference from first to last.’ 77 
 
Policy implementation 
This leads to the final point; implementation. When the IFLNS felt that the League 
failed to live up to its task, it attempted to push the implementation of policies. One of 
the most far-reaching examples comes from the minorities’ question, where the 
Federation set up a procedure in parallel to the League. The League Minority Protection 
System, administered by the League Secretariat, has been criticised from many 
quarters, but has recently been more positively evaluated in the historiography, arguing 
that given the highly contentious situation, where minority states were resistant, 
minorities and their kin-states continually argued for change and the great powers above 
all wanted to avoid being dragged in, the Minority Section managed to create a system 
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that kept all parties involved, talking and in some cases brought solutions. Eric Colban, 
the director of the Minorities’ Section, secured a central role for the Secretariat.78 The 
system was based on ‘depoliticization through bureaucracy, secrecy and diplomacy’ so 
as ‘to resolve inherently political issues without fanfare or complaint.’79 Nonetheless, 
it left many unsatisfied and the system was at odds with the precepts of the New 
Diplomacy. It was predicated on secrecy that kept petitioners in the dark about the 
outcome of their complaints and thus left the League open for attack as ineffective.  
As a result, numerous private organizations entered the minority stage; writing 
about minority questions, visiting, gathering information, making contacts and 
engaging in reconciliation work. Some set up committees that received petitions. 
Willoughby Dickinson, frustrated at the perceived inability of the League to deal 
efficiently with this question, suggested that the Federation set up a Minorities’ 
Committee. The novelty of this Committee, set up in 1923, was that the various 
minorities were engaged in the proceedings, which the League explicitly did not do.80 
Moreover, it also provided a platform for minorities that were not covered by a treaty, 
such as Germans and Slovenes in Italy. In principle, the Committee worked with 
League associations that were run by minorities as well as with national League 
organizations in minority and kin states. After these consultations representatives of the 
minority and majority groups were heard. The Committee avoided appearing to 
adjudicate, but rather sought to facilitate reconciliation or at the very least 
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rapprochement between the parties involved. 81  The outcome of such initiatives 
depended largely on local circumstances.82 The Federation also published a Bulletin 
Minorités Nationales. They were reluctant to publish too much information, often 
giving more general information or just circulating information amongst committee 
members in confidence (which was sometimes leaked to the press nonetheless). For its 
reconciliation work trips were very important, but also here publicity was by and large 
avoided. When the IFLNS decided to publish impressions from a carefully planned and 
executed trip by Bakker-van Bosse to Rumania, Yugoslavia and Italy in 1930, this 
immediately backfired and the report was used by all sides to add fuel to the fire.83  
As the IFLNS experienced the benefits of discretion, they became a trusted 
interlocutor for the Minorities Section. The League had followed the activities of 
private organizations, and in particular of the IFLNS Committee, closely from the start. 
As another example of the tight network, William O’Molony, the first Anglophone 
Assistant Secretary-General of the IFLNS now member of the Minority Section, was 
by 1930 charged to report on the work of the IFLNS. The relationship was reciprocal. 
The IFLNS for example provided the Section with the reports of their trips and checked 
about possible agenda points at meetings. Given that this system was based on trust, 
the Section occasionally, and only to certain people, gave feedback on why a petition 
did not succeed or gave advice on how to phrase petitions.84  
Considering the twin pillars of propaganda and policy work, IFLNS activities 
in the minority field constituted the most far-reaching policy work. Given the 
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circumstances and with a stronger focus on reconciliation and discretion than on 
publication, this system worked relatively well, in conjunction to the League Minority 
Protection System. The IFLNS certainly filled a gap by giving the minority and kin 
state a role in the process. Nonetheless, with time frustration at the lack of progress 
increased amongst the activists, many of whom at one point or another despaired along 
the lines of Ruyssen who wrote in 1930 that minorities would always be victims.85 As 
Dyroff points out however, the measure of success is perhaps best found in the 
‘contribution to the creation of a climate that facilitated a peaceful exchange of views 
and search for compromises.’86 As such, the IFLNS fulfilled its task as liaison between 





The IFLNS played a significant role in the network around the League. As one of the 
principal civil society players in the era of the New Diplomacy, it entered into a 
reciprocal relationship with the League Secretariat and functioned as a liaison between 
the supposedly neutral League and the more political states/minorities. While the 
Federation emphasised openness and the importance of public opinion, in practice its 
strategy was more refined. The propaganda and education work took place largely in 
public view and was geared to strengthening public opinion in favour of the League. In 
the work geared toward governments and the League itself publicity was important, but 
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informal contacts and discretion were equally, if not more, important and often more 
effective.  
 Part of the reason why the latter approach was more effective was the fact that it 
could be better controlled. The Federation as a platform was easily used for unintended 
purposes which more often than not did not promote international peace and 
understanding. Pedersen made this point regarding the League itself: public opinion, 
despite the best efforts, is not necessarily pacific.87 In its efforts to maintain contacts 
between nations and organisations which came to believe in very different things, the 
IFLNS was, despite itself, sometimes used for un-pacific purposes.  
In terms of propaganda and education the Federation lived up to its aspirations of 
acting as an avant-garde, although it probably did not manage to create the ‘powerful 
international public opinion’ Smuts had had in mind. In its efforts geared towards the 
League and governments the IFLNS was quite successful in terms of agenda-setting, 
whereas its endeavours toward policy formulation and implementation were perhaps a 
little more varied. ‘Democratic oversight’ also remained mostly an aspiration as the 
IFLNS exercised ‘excessive prudence’ and often bowed to state interest. However, 
being an unofficial organisation - more unofficial than today’s NGO’s with consultative 
status - the IFLNS had a certain leeway to table topics that were not yet ripe for official 
discussion. Given the generally high level of the activists, discussion at the IFLNS gave 
an idea of how certain topics might develop once they reached the official agenda. The 
fact that its activists were so well connected was the Federation’s biggest asset, and the 
one that carried over its experiences to its successor the WFUNA and other 
international organizations in the post-1945 period. 
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Civil and official society were intimately entwined in terms of personnel, methods 
and objectives. The IFLNS mirrored and foreshadowed the League in many ways, in 
its organisation, its efforts to spur the League on; in its successes and its misfortunes. 
Where as Zara Steiner put it ‘the Geneva System was an [adjunct] to great power 
politics’88, the IFLNS operated within and contributed to this system and as such took 
part in the governing of the world.  
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